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**ON TRANSCENDENTAL
MYSTICISM**

This article offers a critical analysis of the general idea of “overcoming Kant”, presented by Ye. N. Trubetskoy in the book “The metaphysical assumptions of knowledge” (1917).

Key words: *transcendentalism, Kantianism, mysticism, anthropologism, psychologism, epistemology, substantiation of knowledge, ontology, metaphysic of all-unity, absolute consciousness.*

The major works of Eugeny Nickolaevitch Trubetskoy (1863–1920), who belonged to an old princely family stemming from Dmitry Bryanskiy, Chernigovsky, Starodubsky and Trubchesky, a grandson of Great Duke of Lithuania Gediminas who was killed in Vorskla battle in 1399, are very well known. I mean primarily his “World picturing by V. Soloviev” [4], which he began in summer of 1909 in Begichev, published in two volumes in 1913 and which contained not only an attempt at systematization of ideas of his mentor but also immanent criticism of his views. Later came a triptych on philosophical understanding of Russian religious art [5–7], and, finally, “The meaning of life” [9], which was written in hard and tragic times of final evaluation of his life. Much less lucky was the fate of The Experience of overcoming Kant and Kantianism [8], written at the least suitable time, having long become a bibliographical rarity, so far incurring little interest with the researchers and not reprinted. In this article I would like to draw the attention of those who are interested in Kant’s philosophy to this book and express my personal attitude to its general idea.

Both dissertations written by E. Trubetskoy indicate a certain influence of V. Soloviev, who appreciated the mission of western Christianity for the world historical process, as well as prince’s overarching interest towards finding an ideal in life of a person and society, an ideal which flies in unlimited height over the sinful reality, serves as an etalon to it and is capable of such world *transformation* that could eliminate the differences between the existing and the due. The final “Meaning of Life” is obvious to show the idea which always stays behind his thorough “overcoming of Kant”, which – I am convinced – had non of the purely “logical”, “immanent”, scientific and “epistemological” character em-

phasized by the author himself, and was determined by his mindset and character, his cherished principles, his understanding of life and human values. All his philosophical endeavor was to find a *meaning* in this horrible world, tormented by obvious meaninglessness and bringing about the feeling of a *total catastrophe*, which is not just inevitable, but already happening. Placing this issue into the center of philosophic research gives it a fundamental metaphysical dimension: the meaning of human life is determined by the meaning of *being* in general and the essence of *knowledge* as such. Christianity was seen by Trubetskoy as the only way to find this meaning — as the immediate possibility for any knowledge — and to avoid the catastrophic global meaninglessness. The backbone of all his thoughts about Kant's "mistakes" is not *logic* of founding and proving: indeed, they are steered by unshaken *belief* in the truth of the Biblical revelation, in endless cosmic strength of Christ as the eternal spiritual center of universal body and world history, in Godlike humanity, which is "awaited by every creature with hope" [3, p. 171]. A single force made the prince fight with Kant, confront and overcome him — the same great power, which made such a rationally, clearly and logically thinking V. Soloviev believe quite literally that "*there is a global covenant, reinstating all of humanity, and through this, the whole nature*", and that "*the lion will eat straw*" [3, p. 77–78].

The author himself stated that the book contained ideas which "are in direct continuity" [8, p. 306] to the "Theoretical philosophy" of Soloviev and "tend to the exact implementation" [ibid.] of his intended program: This haughty analogy that Kant drew between Copernicus and himself should be lined and humbled and he, Kant, as some Copernicus of philosophy showed that the earth of empirical reality, as a dependent planet, revolves around the ideal sun — the cognizing reason. However, the development of astronomy didn't stop with Copernicus, and we now know that the centrality of the sun is only relative and that our star has its real center somewhere in this infinite space. So Kant's sun — the cognizing subject — should, too, be relieved of the value which is improper. Our *self*, even transcendently widened, can hardly be the focus and the source of true knowledge, and philosophy takes advantage over astronomy in having the center of the truth, located in a good rather than "bad" infinity, can be reached anytime, anywhere — inside" [1, p. 212]. However, this objective of an anti-Kantian *Christian-Ptolemaic counter-revolution* comprises only a part of a much broader heretical program, also drafted by Soloviev and implemented in Trubetskoy's book in relation to Kant studies — to use the "definition of pure logical thought, that have been perfectly developed in the recent German philosophy" for the "full logical comprehension" of the objects of the Christian faith [3, p. 82]. Thus, the author's task was twofold: to logically clarify his faith with Kant's assistance and to "overcome" Kant through the Christian faith. It must be mentioned that Trubetskoy clearly recognized both the inevitability of arising from this task antinomies (and he was not afraid to articulate and discuss them in detail), and charges made by two opposing sides: "Some people will blame me for false mysticism, while others — for false rationalism" [8, p. 66].

The second philosophical pillar of Trubetskoy's main idea was also referred to by Soloviev, who after F. Jacobi recognized the possibility of *direct perception of absolute reality* in mystical experience, and also saw the *continuous participation* of this "mystical element" in *any* act of cognition. "The background of true knowledge, — he wrote — is a mystical or religious perception, the only source where our logical thinking gets its *unconditional* wisdom, and our experience — the

value of unconditional reality" [2, p. X]. Perception and thinking, experience and reason, he explained further, are "fused" with each other, turning into *knowledge*, objective and true, only because we have *faith*: "Every time we really get to know some subject, we... claim its irrelevant existence, claim it not only as perceived and conceivable by us, but as a being independent of us... We *feel* a certain response, *think* of its common features and are *confident* in its own or absolute existence... if I were not sure that a certain object exists independently of me, I could not relate it to my ideas and feelings, then these very ideas and feelings would be just subjective states of my consciousness... Thus, the objective cognitive value of my sensations and concepts depends on confidence in the independent, unconditional existence of the relevant object... This is an absolute existence... which can not be a subject of any empirical or rational knowledge and which, however, determines the knowledge — is, obviously, the subject of a special, third kind of knowledge which is rightly called faith" [2, p. 325–326]. And this "faith", in turn, is only possible because both the cognizing subject and the object of cognition are connected to each other "internally", "in the very foundations of their beings, and in what is unconditional in both", and this unconditional *necessarily* has to be found in both the learnt object and the learning subject, and it "is required and expected by the contingent facts and forms of our knowledge" [2, p. 326–327]. This idea was further strengthened by Soloviev in his unfinished sketches of "Theoretical Philosophy": if he had previously erased the line existing in faith (or mystical intuition) between subject and object of knowledge, now he erased the line between subjects. The point of his critique of the metaphysical individualism and *substantiality* of the cognizing «I» is reduced, according to his student, to the fact that a separate empirical human subject beyond the *unconditional Truth* is — nothing [4, vd. 2, p. 237]. Trubetskoy coined these thoughts of his teacher into two concepts — the concept of *unconditional* and the idea of *absolute consciousness*, which serve as the cornerstone of "overcoming" Kant and Kantianism. According to the basic philosophical Trubetskoy's belief, the concept of *all-unity* purely logically leads to the notion of *united consciousness* because unity would not be such, if it were just common being and did not include completeness of consciousness — full awareness of common unity. In other words, God is absolute, unconditional and All-Unity, he not only *is* All-Unity, he also *knows* all about himself (i.e. about everything). If God were just "all in all", but was unaware of this and did not know about it, did not think of himself, then it would damage His perfection or completeness, and thus He would not be God.

The critics of the "Copernicus of philosophy" understood his fundamental thought correctly: the center of gravity of the whole Kantian system is in recognition of *independence of man as a cognizing subject*. Although man is finite and the original condition of his being and knowledge neither known to him nor dependent on him, he discovers the world around and his own self through his sensory perception, as a true *subject*, creator and bearer of his thoughts; he is independent in his learning from any other superhuman, higher rational being, has no "parent entity", which would be in charge of his cognitive capacities, in other words — he is *autonomous*, exercises his own supreme laws and the forms of his learning process and activities in his own self. Knowledge doesn't exist on its own, it is initially created by man, it's the result of his spontaneous and creative activity. Therefore, the first task "in the fight against Kant" for both Trubetskoy and Soloviev were to *deprive man* in his cognition of "undue pretension to be the

central star", to deprive him of autonomy, initiative and to make him dependent of the absolute, unconditional, infinite, superhuman entity. That is the starting point for the "correct assessment" of Kant: the basic reliability of any knowledge cannot be found in trust towards human mind, because the mind does not have a foothold in itself and can only search for it in something higher and unconditional. Trubetskoy is very vivid in explaining the reason for his objections to Copernicus: "It turns out that our human knowledge is in some ways like a *solar process* — the process of initiation of human consciousness to solar energy of the All-Unity and Unconditional. All-Unity is presupposed by our cognizing thought in the same way as the sun is presupposed by vegetation. Therefore, the epistemological doctrine that wants to understand our cognitive thought only *from itself*, in itself and in nothing else to prove the possibility of knowledge, commits the same mistake that a botanist would make if he wanted to explain the possibility of vegetation without the sun — by sheer capacities of the plant alone" [8, p. 308–309].

Trubetskoy emphasizes here, that the way of overcoming Kant doesn't go through the 'external' criticism, that is, a simple opposition of criticism to some particular principles, different views, other beliefs, and so on, but — by a much more powerful and persuasive immanent criticism, which comes from the "inside", the merit of which is that it not only recognizes and retains all the great achievements of Kant, the reason why his system is so attractive to many of his followers, but also goes in *the same direction* as Kant, though further and deeper, revealing *undiscovered* by him but *necessary requirements* and assumptions (metaphysical) of his own teaching, and thus accomplishing his own "transcendental method". Thus, the critical transcendentalism which understood itself quite well, is to become a *mystic* one, and Christian mysticism by reaching logical and philosophical clarity must become *transcendental*.

Kant, according to the original idea of Trubetskoy, wanted to build a *theory of knowledge without any metaphysics*. Meanwhile, all knowing as such always inevitably rests on metaphysical assumptions, and thus it is impossible to build epistemology without support of ontology. This is the reason why every follower of Kant had to go beyond its "epistemologism" — to the very metaphysics, which (allegedly) the teacher denied. Therefore it is necessary to recognize the *limited* truth of the "Copernican revolution": of course, *a priori forms of thought* do exist, and they approve of experiment, but this discovery of Kant only makes for "the first step to epistemology" [8, p. 13]. The second stage is the recognition that man, as a thinking subject, is not the highest, not the unconditional bearer of the knowledge, therefore, *a priori* is rooted not in human, but in superhuman, absolute consciousness. Thus, the main slogan of the new, mystical transcendentalism — Let's get rid of dogmatic anthropologism! Equating *a priori* with the forms of human consciousness is dogmatic. This is where Kant himself proves to be dogmatic. A sound transcendental issue discussed by Kant is not developed properly: "Kant's point of view does not give any satisfactory resolution of the issue of the possibility of experience" [8, p. 104]. The question is proper, but the answer is marred by Kant's anthropologism and psychologism, which he tried to deny, but left this denial a mere declaration. To bring the Kantian question about the conditions of the possibility of knowledge to some kind of resolution would mean to uncover through reflection, or in other words, to *realize* as the original and absolutely necessary, the *ontological* or *metaphysical* presupposition which stands behind *any* cognitive judgment. Kant was the first to draw attention to the fact that in every judgment we do not just "connect the con-

cepts". It is no accident that we can connect them by the verb, which means "*being*". Any judgment itself simply by its form (S is P) always aspires for *objective* validity. Trubetskoy reinforces the idea of Kant infinitely: no claim to *objective* validity of our judgment (that *the object itself* has certain property, and not the "I think" that it does) would be impossible if we did not thus think the truth of our judgment to be *absolute* (eternal), and thus did not presuppose the existence of an *absolute consciousness*, which alone could contain eternal truths, just as the infinite series of natural numbers can be accommodated entirely only in the infinite intellect. This is the highest *a priori* condition of the possibility of any knowledge, any cognitive judgment: "unconditional thought is a transcendental condition of everything that exists" [8, p. 21].

By directing their attention at any, even the most insignificant, subject, we thus implicitly and quietly *have already presupposed* a comprehensive and infinite being; having thought annoying nuisance of a fly which interferes with my reading, I have thought not only the *eternal truth*, I have also suggested the existence of *absolute consciousness*, which eternally supposes a fly, and its annoyance and my frustration about this. "Any truth, even if it's a truth about some short-lived fact, is necessarily *eternal*" [8, p. 22]. Considering the fly as a real object, I have thus assumed *the whole truth*, which "embraces everything conceivable", everything existing, everything that used to exist, that will exist, everything that can and cannot exist. This is the very deep essence of any cognitive act – to link the immediate object of learning to "that, which is unconditional and necessarily relevant", to refer it to a "real All-Unity". Real All-Unity, constantly and continuously present incognito in all our thoughts, is the "central star" which "Copernicus of philosophy" failed to notice, and so ignored. "In any knowledge, whatever it may concern, there is some transcensus, *the path of the knowing subject to unconditional*. The main fault of Kant is his failure to recognize it" [8, p. 17]. Having failed to notice the main thing – the omnipresent and omniscient God – Kant adopted man as a true subject of learning and fell into the illusion of "anthropologism" and "psychologism", in other words, sided with the "false immanentism".

Therefore, if I know something, it's not just me who knows it, but, strictly speaking, it's not me at all, and if my idea is true, then this idea is not "mine". If truth were the domain of human and *human thought* alone, not only it would have been untrue, it would have never existed. Truth is not a personal fantasy, it exists independently of man and of psychological (empirical) subject. If there were no "All-Unity thought" which simultaneously and atemporally accounted for the whole of universe, for everything that was gone forever, everything that hasn't come to exist yet, but that will come, then there wouldn't be any tiniest human thought – "true thought and absolute thought are same terms". [8, p. 23]. Moreover, there would be no false thoughts, delusions, hallucinations, drunk and mad ravings – "if it were not for the absolute consciousness of my dream, there would be no dream itself," "objective story or hallucination – all the same – everything is true... in all its concreteness" [8, p. 48]. In fact, the absolute idea is not just a "thought", it is a particular intuition, which covers the infinite variety of what used to exist, exists now and will exist, which is immanent to this diversity and infinite variety, comprising any disgrace, and that does not just human-like differentiate between human feeling and thinking, unity and plurality, in which "everything is lit through, everything is flooded with unfading light of sunshine, everything is clear..." [8, p. 26]. Inability to conceive of this absolute fullness of consciousness (which, however, as we know, everyone al-

ready assumes in every act of knowledge!), inability to go beyond the limits of our human concepts is found in "fatal rationality" in Kant, as well as in his followers — Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and even entire "New Age philosophical thought". It may seem that, having reached this point, and going beyond the mind, it would be appropriate to indulge in folly, multiple untold mystical intuitions and dissolve your atman in Brahman. However, the concept of transcendental mysticism rejects alogism. Trubetskoy is not Berdyaev, who saw "confusion" in the rationality and "healthy and norm" in mysticism. Going beyond human concepts and human consciousness in general is to be implemented within the framework of a clear mind and a coherent argument. "Unconditional consciousness, which envelopes everything and real in a single glance, the completeness of eternally existent, infinite time lines, that contains in motionless tranquility of Truth everything that used to exist, everything that does and will exist, — that is the starting point of our knowledge, this is the one central light of the universe, around which the entire solar system of our human knowledge rotates. This the basic assumption of our knowledge remains uncovered by Kant, and, thus, his Copernican discovery did not receive the required completion" [8, p. 33].

So Kant boldly questioned the absolute validity of knowledge background, and not having resolved this issue, it was impossible to move forward. It caught philosophical attention to his study, but the answer given in "Critique of Pure Reason" did not correspond to its subject, as the absolute truth of knowledge could hardly be anthropologically proven. Anthropologism is a branch of philosophical thought, which sees everything human as unconditional. The absurdity of such an enterprise is obvious — with all due respect for human dignity, this view is obviously finite, imperfect, its existence is dependent and uncertain.

Trubetskoy applies this idea to the basic principles of "The Critique of Pure Reason", following step by step its structure and, in fact, just recalling every major problem addressed by Kant.

For example, a priori judgments about space and time really are possible, but only because some of them *consider understanding of such judgments as absolute*. Geometry as a science, and any single geometric theorem is possible only because the space itself (like all infinite time) is real and exists in the "absolute consciousness" along with everything that is there, that used to be, or will be there. Every geometric knowledge (the present, the future, everything possible) in a sense has already been fixed in the same absolute consciousness.

Likewise, the general forms of our thoughts, categories, such as, for example, the law of causality, are valid, a priori, for the whole of nature, for any experience and knowledge, but not because they are a necessary form of our human thoughts, but only because that they are really quite independent of whether or not we and even the human race exist, in other words — because it is a form of God's thoughts. The essence of the mystical transcendentalism defines God as a true "transcendental subject", that is the first and the most significant condition of the possibility of any being and any knowledge. If the material of *our* judgment had not been already related to the categories *unconditionally*, that is *prior to us and independently of us*, the people, then we wouldn't have been able to connect anything objectively, as our knowledge about a *subject*. Within the same Kant's anthropologism and psychologism it is basically impossible to go beyond the subjective perceptions, to approach the subject itself.

In this light, Kant's notion of "self" is thoroughly revised. According to Trubetskoy, a man ceases to be a true subject of his own thoughts, and then "I"

ceases to be a pure act of self-consciousness, which exists only in the very same act: "Even if I did not think of myself and even forgot about myself – after all, I am... my "self" ... the way it must be in the Unconditional" [8, p. 87]. Kant follows Descartes: I think, therefore I exist as a true subject of all my sensations and thoughts. However, Baader is more true to life having said that I am and I think only because *I am thought*. Therefore, Kant's famous transcendental apperception, the original synthetic unity which he while succumbed to the temptation of anthropologism and psychologism, considered the highest principle of all philosophy, is nothing else than the intuition of our "I" in the absolute consciousness, a priori certainty (that could allow any knowledge) that with all my ideas I am completely "dissolved" in the absolute consciousness that feels everything that I feel, and thinks what I think, though it is not mistaken with me, because it feels and thinks "all", staying simultaneously both in me and outside me, being immanent and transcendent: "... in the absolute consciousness the whole series of representations of every conscious human subject is fully deployed from the beginning to the end of," "all my ideas in it have been since the very beginning" [8, p. 90].

Kant is limitedly right in his theory of knowledge as a synthesis of views on a priori forms. New (to us) knowledge is expressed in the form of synthetic judgments, though the overall purpose of this synthesis in our human consciousness is only in partial reproduction of the "absolute synthesis" that "from the beginning" has already stayed in the unconditional consciousness. This point most clearly demonstrates that it's not the continuity, but the exact opposition differentiates the views of Kant and Trubetskoy: the former insists on the knowledge which is produced through a creative act of human activity, which makes a new knowledge possible, there is true development of cognition, etc., the latter sees no creativity and nothing new in the world, not at all (because the creation is not inherent in the world, or in a creature, but in the Creator), and the man only repeats, reproduces that in whatever way "already is". What in God (absolute consciousness) is simply given (communication of my ideas, originated from even before I was born, and regardless of my existence!), I am "set": "From this century, the absolute synthesis of my ideas is not given in the absolute consciousness but set" [8, p. 93]. Trubetskoy is not apprehensive about inevitable contradiction which arises here, and he confidently says, "*My perceptions are really given in absolute consciousness: they really set in it and understood before my birth*" [8, p. 105–106] (my italics. — S.Ch.). Alas, "we can learn only what is absolutely and forever understood" [8, p. 132]. The creative activity of man as the only and true subject of his ideas, in recognition of his freedom and autonomy is the essence and the meaning of transcendentalism, so overcoming Kant through the assimilation of his truth, as Trubetskoy originally believed, is purely *verbal*: the link between the whole study with Kant's theory can be traced only in terms which totally change their meaning when immersed in the context of metaphysical unity.

Thus, the categories are not the functions of unity among our ideas, not the forms of spontaneous synthesis of the sensual diversity, but the forms of the original intuition of the Unconditional, the ways of corresponding any cognitive content to the original unity, awareness of its involvement in the absolute consciousness, which already from the beginning "has contained the whole system of categories". A priori character of categories does not lie in the fact that they make any experience possible: they are "grounded in the Absolute, and thus in-

dependent of any experience, for they must precede the experience of all human beings, who are born" [8, p. 103]. The world in under the God's control — this is the "basic a priori definition of" everything "other" in relation to God, that is, the world in general, and to its every creature.

Trubetskoy also dealt with another famous problem of the "thing in itself", which is easily solved, if considered on the same assumption. Kant is right that we may know only phenomena, since our cognitive process involves our own ideas and concepts. "There is no reality beyond our mind, and things cannot exist as a "thing in itself", but as *things in absolute consciousness*" [8, p. 132]. Critical, transcendental viewpoint can easily recognize just an image, representation in what was considered "the thing itself", "reality" before Kant. Science, for example, seeks to know the true structure of the world, using the subjective phenomena of human experience only as of the auxiliary material. But this does not mean that science describes the "things in themselves", "as they are." It describes an *absolute phenomenon*, atoms, molecules, the motion of the planets around the sun, etc. — they *constitute the mind* (and Kant is correct in saying that), but — not only *our mind*, and then we can talk about independence of the person and his awareness of their existence. For example, how about the fact that "the emergence of the solar system", "the formation of the Earth", "origin of life" on it and so on — these are actually views of modern science, that is, human ideas, but the Sun, Earth, and life on it existed before man and all his ideas? There is a solution — yes, these are views though they are not ours, but of the absolute consciousness, which is inherently ours, temporal and subjective. Only because of the presence of absolute consciousness in the human and the human immersion in the absolute, we are able to recognize the limits of this knowledge, that is to rise above ourselves, our own human perspective.

We are able to go in and out of transcendence, staying at the same time *inside*, with our own ideas. The problem of knowledge can be resolved only through such transcendence that means *exiting* the human consciousness and *entering* some other, an absolute one, but at the same time, no doubt, the knowledge is only possible by *immanence* of absolute consciousness — our, human, "so we can find it, *staying within* our consciousness" (italics are mine. — S.Ch.). So, to justify the knowledge you need *to get out* of our consciousness, while *remaining within* it! This contradiction does not bother Trubetskoy, he sees it as a necessary "antinomy of knowledge", which forms the epistemological aspect of ontological antinomy of the Absolute and its Alter, transcendence and immanence, which is inherent in the metaphysics of the All-Unity.

Trubetskoy doesn't see the weakness in this antinomy, for example, the concept of self, which cannot make ends meet, but (to a certain extent here following Kant), the inevitable consequence of the limitations of the human mind, which has not yet reached the "highest and final perfection" [8, p. 177]. Following Kant, he believes that the antinomy is no dignity or advantage of the argument, it is not inherent in the natural, or true, thinking, that it is a temporary state of knowledge and should eventually be overcome. In absolute consciousness (in truth) there is no antinomy: Trubetskoy is inclined to subordinate the divine thinking to the laws of logic. Kantian-Soloviev training protects him from the exalted fantasy and nonsense, like Berdiaev's statement that categorical way of thinking is the result of "damage by a sin. "The concept of "alogical" or "logically formless" should be completely discarded. There is nothing real, possible, probable or conceivable, that does not have its own category, its a priori. In other words, we must "complete the universality of logical form principle" because" all

knowable prior to our cognition and judgment is related through categories and subjects to the logical form" [8, p. 304].

Another very interesting aspect of this book is the criticism of "alogism" and irrational interest to intuition which is juxtaposed to the discursive clarity. The broad dissemination of such sentiments is accepted by Trubetskoy as "ominous signs of impending rapid mental decline" [8, p. 179]. His opinion is in some ways similar to the one of Kant. "Intuition alone – he writes – not proven with a reflection of discursive thought, represents a questionable and not always reliable source of knowledge... it's necessary to check intuition with any objective criteria... discursive thought – reflection – in both cases is the necessary tool... only after cross-checking of all the arguments for and against, all the means of thought – you can rely on intuition... we should not forget that healing a thought requires its own active involvement and cooperation, and no other feeling, no good deed, nor any other power, an alien one, can release it from its internal contradictions " [8, p. 172–180]. It should be, however, noted that the same protection of the supreme law of reason in Kant, directed against Jacobi, was not quite fair – the quoted passage from Trubetskoy's book will be willingly signed by the author of the "philosophy of feeling and faith."

By the way, Trubetskoy's emotional criticism of physical and theological proof of God's existence matched the spirit of Jacobi, and was obviously based on his personal experience of the events of the war and the Russian Revolution: "from the very beginning it is based on *falsification* of sense data... It is possible to believe in God only *in spite of* that purposefulness, which is seen in external nature, not *because of* it... Vulgarly of physical-theological proof is that it seeks to verify God's Wisdom exactly where the deviation from it by the creature is most obvious and clear " [8, p. 192–193].

The second part of the book is devoted to the critique of neo-Kantianism, which is a far less interesting phenomenon than the very doctrine of Kant. This part presents nothing new in the philosophical sense, as the thoughts of Cohen, Rickert and Lask "roam in the same vicious circle as "The Critique" of Kant" [8, p. 226]. All of these are pre-doomed to failure attempts to substantiate the accuracy of the knowledge within the "anthropological" boundaries. For example, the doctrine of Rickert, like Kant's one, remains to be "metaphysics which is not aware of its metaphysical character." Rickert rightly sees the main issue of the theory of knowledge in how and why *immanent* to our consciousness representations have a *transcendent* meaning, that is, the value of *learning* of an independent subject. Anthropologism makes this difficulty insurmountable and eventually Rickert has to admit the unity of the transcendent and the immanent to be an inexplicable miracle, which means a simple rejection of all a theory of knowledge. To recognize that the very opposite of the transcendent and the immanent is only one of the planes of consciousness is the only way to build this theory, and thus to understand the knowledge and to prove it. Another, higher plane of consciousness doesn't simply hold it. For All-Unity consciousness "everything is immanent," although for me it is partly immanent and partly transcendent, because there is no finite mind which can accommodate absolute. Absolute consciousness is truly transcendent, it ought to be conformed with by the process of our learning, but, as it is consistent with our knowledge of the absolute consciousness, the transcendent becomes immanent to us, insofar as super-psychic becomes the meaning of the psychic, and the psychic gets unconditional value. This is the resolution of the basic question of the theory of knowledge... *Our knowledge is possible as an indivisible unity of human and absolute thought* " [8, p. 316].

In science, there is an idea of a too strong hypothesis. For example, the existence of God, which is a sufficient cause for everything to exist, from a scientific point of view is a too strong hypothesis: it explains everything at once, and the explanation is uniform ("in all the will of God"), and therefore, it does not explain anything. Justification of knowledge, undertaken by Trubetskoy in overcoming Kant, is perhaps stronger than the strongest. Postulate of absolute consciousness cannot justify the possibility and validity of human knowledge for the simple reason that in its blinding light the human knowledge just disappears, in the same way as the other distinctions disappear — between a thought and its object, being and consciousness, truth and error, the actual and possible, between something that used to exist, something that exists now and will exist. And, finally, Kant's "anthropologism" cannot be compared to that of the most demanding critic of anthropologism and psychologism in the justification of knowledge. It's not just that "absolute consciousness" is entirely constructed by Trubetskoy out of human consciousness, as there is nothing else to build from. Recognizing a person as "the main subject in the world", Kant did not and could not consider on the basis of his principles, the history of mankind, and especially the revelation of Jesus of Nazareth, to be the center and the focus of not only the history of the universe, but also of the coming transformation of the universe and its return to the divine unity.

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